Abstract

Validity, Affluence, and Morality

For more than 50 years, Peter Singer has argued that we are required to donate to aid agencies. Singer’s argument to this conclusion is both incredibly famous and ubiquitous. While there has been no shortage of commentators who reject one of its three premises, no one appears to have directly rejected his argument on the grounds that it is invalid. In fact, on the contrary, it is fairly common to see claims affirming its validity. In this article, I show that despite these commonplace claims, Singer’s supposedly common-sense morality arguments are invalid. To be charitable, I also offer, in this article, a fair and valid version of the argument that respects the totality of Singer’s work on helping the world’s poor. As I highlight though, the move to protect Singer’s argument from the charge of being invalid comes with some costs, and, as I motivate through a critique of this new argument, these costs are unpalatable. Ultimately, these considerations lead me to the following conclusion: while we have an obligation to help those less fortunate than ourselves, we do not necessarily have an obligation to donate to aid agencies to help them, nor would we do something wrong if we failed to do so—provided that we fulfilled our obligation to help.

Biographic note

Joshua Luczak is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Singapore Management University. He completed this PhD at the University of Western Ontario, and has held positions at Georgetown University, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Monash University, RMIT, and the University of Salzburg. He is an editorial and administrative assistant at Philpapers, and a member of the Rotman Institute of Philosophy. 

Joshua Luczak

Assistant Professor of Philosophy

School of Social Sciences

Singapore Management University

joshmluczak@gmail.com